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NOTES.
CARRIERS---"ACT OF GOD"-IS N'EGLIGE.N-CE THE PROXIMATE
CAUSE?-EFFECT OF CARMACK AMEND'MENT-A recent decision'

of the Supreme Judicial Court of .Maine is of more than passing
interest. For, although it lays down no new principle of law on this
subject, yet by the application of another principle it achieves a
result which, if followed, is bound to have a tremendous effect.'
Goods had been shipped over the defendant line, on a bill of lading
which exempted the carrier from liability fo; loss caused by an Act
of God. Through negligence they were delayed and so reached
Dayton, Ohio, in time to be damaged in the flood of a few years
past. Without more, this presents the question which of two well-

'Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Me. Cent. Ry. Co.. 99 Ad. 259 (Me. 1916).
-(571)
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known views as to liability is to be followed. But this occurred
since the Carmack Amendment,- and so it was necessary to consider at least a part of that-being an interstate shipment.3 Was
the cause of the damage the Act of God, or the negligence of the
carrier? If the latter, obviously it could not exempt itself and so
would be liable.
That there are conflicting decisions on this point the court
recognized. Could it make a free choice, or was there one view
that it was bound to take? The court came to the conclusion that
it was compelled to follow the ruling of the Federal courts on
this question. For since there is a Federal statute covering the subject it is removed from the sphere of state action, 4 and the prime
object of the Carmack Amendment being to secure a uniform rule
of responsibility as to interstate commerce,5 the law as administered
in the Federal courts and affected by the Acts of Congress had to
be followed.' Accordingly it was held that the defendant was not
liable. On the authority of this case then, hereafter when the shipment is interstate the rule laid down in R. R. v. Reeves1 must be
followed. Is this result desirable?
One of the earliest cases in this country was Morrison v.
Davis, which laid the foundation for the Federal rule. There the
court was confronted with the task of deciding whether the carrier's
negligence was the proximate cause, or the Act of God. The result
is based largely on the test of foresight. Could the carrier have
foreseen that the goods would be overwhelmed by such a casualty,
as a result of its negligence? The answer is in the negative-and
rightly so. The negligent act is then viewed as merely one of a
series of antecedent events, necessary no doubt to enable the Act ot
2Act of June 6. i9o6, Chap. 3591, Sec. 7,pars. II & I2; U. S. Stat. at
Large, p. 59.5.
'The part applicable reads: -That any common carrier, railroad or
transportation company receiving property for transportation from a point
in one state to a ipoint' in another, shall issue a receipt or bill of lading
therefor and shall be liable to the lawful holder thereof for any loss;
damage or injury to such property caused by it or by any common carrier,
railroad or transportation company to -which such property ma1y be delivered or over -whose line or lines such property may pass, and no contract,
receipt, rule or ,regulation shall exempt such common carrier, railroad or
transportation company from the liability hereby imposed: Providing, that
nothing in this section shall deprive any holder of such receipt or bill
of lading of any remedy or right of action which he has under existing
law."
. Nor. Pac. Ry. v. State of Wash., 222 U. S. 370 (igit).
'A. T. & S. F. Ry. Y.Harold. 241 U. S. 241 U. S. 371 (z916).
'Ga., Fla. & Ala. Ry. Y.Blish Milling Co., 241 U. S. 19o (1916); Cinn.,
etc., Ry. v. Rankin. 241 id. 319 (1916).
t o Wall. 176 tU. S. 189), that the Act of God is the proximate cause;
not the negHgence.
a20 P&. 171 (1852).

NOTES

God to accomplish the given result, but not proximate in the eyes of
and at
the court.' Thiz. line of reasoning has been widely followed,
0
one time probably represented the weight of authority.'
IBut granting that this is a justifiable result from the test used,
is that the correct test? Proximate cause may also be determined
by the natural and probable sequence of events following the negligent act; and admittedly the exact damage need not be foreseen."
That it is the natural result, in the sense that it occurs in the ordinary
course of nature, no one will deny; as to its probability there is more2
doubt. But in Grecn-JVheelcr Shoe Co. v. Chi., R. I. & P. Ry.,"
the court answered this doubt by a very logical reply. Its reasoning
was that, though the carrier could not foresee that particular act,
vet it could foresee that the time of its liability would be extended,
and that accordingly the chance of accident was just so much more
possible. On reasoning such as this, an accident being more possible
if not probable, and the result being natural, the carrier was held
liable. While in result this Iowa case accords with the cases opposed
to the Federal view, yet the reasoning is different. The leading case
in holding the carrier liable4 is still Michaels v. X. Y. Cent. Ry.'
According to a later case,1 the rationale of the New York rule
(so-called) is. that a carrier is always liable unless it can prove the
loss was caused by an Act of God, or the public enemy-or there is
a specific contract exemption. To avail itself of such defense, it
must show freedom from fault at the time. A technical construct
tion of this would perhaps lead to a conclusion that the negligence
was a bar to a certain defense, rather than a proximate cause in
itself. Yet a consideration of the later cases, supposedly based on
do so on the
this one, show that the courts holding the carrier liable,
5
ground that its negligence is the proximate cause." Indeed, it is
probable that at the present time and aside from the effect of the
Maine case, the majority rule is that holding the carrier liable.
Assuming that the Carmack Amendment makes this result necessary. is it a wise one? Text-writers-like the courts-are divided
6
on this subject, some following the Federal view, while others
'St. Louis. etc.. Ry. v.-Commercial is. Co.. 139 U. S. 223 (8go), applied to an exempted liability-a fire.
"Denny v. N. Y. Cent. Ry.. 13 Gray 481 (Mass. 1859 ); Daniels v. Ballantine. 23 Ohio St. 3-32 (i872): Hunt v. Mo.. K. & T. Ry., 74 S. W. 64
(Tex. 19o3).

229 M. 390 (10o7) ; Hill v. Winsor, i 8 Mass.
(1875); McKee v. Harrisurg Traction Co., 21i Pa. 47 (1905).
I:"3O Ia. x23 (rgo6).
"3o N. Y. 564 (1864).

"11. Cent. Ry. v. Siler,

i51

Broom Corn Co. v. A. T. & S. F. Ry.. 94 Minn. -69 (igos).
Wald v. Pittsburgh, etc.. Ry.. i62 III. ,45 {r836): Hersheim v. Newport News & M. V. Co.. t8 Ky. Law 2-7 (1iP6), a case of exempted liability: Pruitt v. Hannibal & St. Jo. Ry., 62 Mo. 527 (1876).
Wi Thompson, Negligence, Sec. 74: Schouler, Bailments (Ed. 1905), Sec.
348; Hale, Bailments & Carriers, p. 36'.
'Bibb
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prefer and justify the New York view. 17 On purely logical reasoning there is something to be said for both views-since they proceed
on different theories in judging proximate cause. But from a standpoint of -business expediency and protection of shippers, it seems
that on the whole the New York view is preferable. Xot that it
cannot be carried to an extreme that would be burdensome to the
carrier. But if administered wisely it is more just to the shipper and
places the loss where it belongs. Under the Federal rule the carrier
can delay thrshipment and escape liability simply because the damage
is converiiently done by an "Act of God." The tendency of late has
been against siuch a result-in fact, the court in the Miaie case
admits that the majority of jurisdictions are probably contra to the
view it adopts. And it is uhfortunate that this salutary holding
should now be changed simply because a Federal Act is so worded
as to be involved whenever the shiphent is interstate. It is doubtful
if Congress realized that this result would follow the Carmack
.\mendmeit; if it did and intended that the Federal rule should be
enforced throughout the country, it is to be regretted, since so many
courts of unquestioned standing have adopted the contrary and more
advantageous view.
R. T. B.
CONSTITUTIONAL L.xw-S.%TE TAX oCOMPANIES-"INTERSTATE

FOREIGN INSURANCE

COMW1ERCE"-"DoiNG

BUSINEsS"-The

extent to which a state may tax a foreign corporation doing business
within its borders has always been a subject of contention between
the various states and the Federal Government; and while the
numerous decisions of the Supreme Court upon the various phases
of this problem have firmly established a number of fundamental

rules, in many close cases there is still a substantial element of doubt
as to what the decision will be. This doubt is due to the difficulty
of applying well-established principles rather than to any uncertainty

as to what principles are to be applied.
It is now settled, beyond peradventure of doubt, that no state
is bound to recognize a foreign corporation as such; nor is any state.
bound to permit such a corporation, as such, to enter the state and
transact business therein, except with such limitations and upon such
conditions as the state may choose to impose." This conclusion is
possible because Article IV, Section - of the Constitution, which
provides that, "The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the
privileges and immunities of the citizens -in the several states," does
"Hutchinson, Carriers (2d Ed.). Sec. zoo; Ray, Negligence of Imposed
Duties (Freight Carriers). p. i75 ff.
'Augusta

Bank v. Earle. 13 Pet. Sig (U. S. 8,39): Pembina Milling

Co. v. rima., u25 U. S. 181

(i889).

NOTES
not apply to artificial persons such as corporations. 2

A state may,

therefore, impose a tax upon a foreign corporation for the privilege
of transacting business within the state, provided that such tax does
not operate as an interference with foreign or interstate commerce,$
nor as an unjust discrimination between different foreign corporations of the same class, after they have been admitted to do business
within the state.4 It is, however, a very difficult problem to say just
what does amount to an interference with interstate commerce. hlie
courts themselves have indicated an uncertainty and a disagreement
upon this subject which has tended to confuse rather than clarify
the .situation. There are, however, certain well-settled principles as
to what constitutes an interference with interstate commerce which
may serve as guideposts toward reaching an accurate conclusion in
any new cases which may arise.
In Paidv. Virginia,* it was decided that the issuing of a policy
of insurance was not a transaction of interstate commerce; and a
corporation whose sole business is the'issuatnce of policies of insurance and the performance of other transactions incident thereto is
not engaged in interstate commerce so as to be immune from regulation bv any state into whose jurisdiction it may come. It therefore
follows that a state may impose any conditions which it sees fit upon
a foreign insurance corporation desiring to do business within the
state for the privilege or franchise of doing such business, just as
in the case of other types of strictly private foreign corporations.'
Accordingly, it has been repeatedly affirmed that a tax on the gross
earnings or receipts within the state of a foieign corporation, not
engaged in interstate commerce, is a proper exercise of the taxing
power, as it is a tax on the privilege of doing business within the
state, measured bv the volume of business done therein7 But a
state may not, under the guise of a tax" on the privilege of doing
-Paul V. Va.. 8 Wnll. W0S(U. S. i l). It .homld be noted. however.
that a private corporation is included under the rc&,gnation of "person".
in the Fourteceth Anicndmnent. Section I. Pembina Milling Co. v. Penna..
supra, u. I.
'Home Ins. Co. v. N. Y., 134 U. S. 594 (m4) : Horn Minintg Co.
v. X. Y.. 14.3 U. S. 305 U8t.92); Com. v. N. Y. L E. & V. R. Co, i- Pa.

St. 46j (1889).
'Henderson v. London, etc., Ins. Co.. t35 Ind. 23 (1893).
8 Wall. 168 (U. S. 1868).
' Note 3, ,upra.
'Society for Savings. etc, v. Coite. 6 W\all. j94 tU. S. 1867):'Southern
Association v. Norman, c8 Ky. -,9L4 :i8c)" Raymond v. Ins. Co., ig6 Ill.
.3-, (19o2): Fargo v. Auditor-Gen.. ;7 Mich. 59g (t885): People v. Home
Ins. Co., 92 N. Y. 328 (1883): W. U. Tel. Co. v. Mayer. 28 Ohio St. 521
(tS6).

Compare also Pittsburgh Life and Trust Co. v. Young. go S. E.

.68 (N. C. io:6). where it was held that a tax on the gross receipts in the
state of a foreign insurance company included premiums paid by policyholders within the state by mail directly to the home office of the com-

pany in another state; and Mutual- Life Ins. Co. v. Ohio. ;q Ohio St. 3o5
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business within the state, levy a propcrly tax on the gross income
of a foreign corporation received within the state during the preceding year, because the power of a state to tax property is limited
to property within its borders, and the gross income received by a
foreign corporation is not necessarily property within the state.
Such. a property tax on gross income of a foreign corporation is
unconstitutional as the taking of property without due process of
law.8 In order for a state to tax a foreign corporation for the
franchise of doing business within the state, it is also necessary that
the corporation should actually carry on business within the state.
An isolated or occasional sale or other business transaction is not
sufficiently a "doing business" within the state so as to subject a
foreign corporation to a franchise tax.9 Also, a foreign corporation
whose entire assets are invested in the stock of a domestic corporation, and whose sole income is derived therefrom, is not "doing
business" within the state."'
The problem as to what extent a state may tax a foreign corporation,.engaged in interstate commerce, is A more difficult one.
The general rule, of course, is that a state may not tax interstate
commerce; from which it follows as a corollary that a state may
not tax a foreign corporation for the privilege of carrying on interstate commerce within its borders, as such a tax would be a direct
burden upon interstate commerce." But a distinction has been
drawn between corporations organized to carry on interstate commerce and having a quasi-public character, and corporations organized to conduct strictly private business; and while in case of the
former, a state may not tax the corporation for the privilege of
conducting its business within the state, in case of the latter the
state may tax the corporation for such privilege, although it is
engaged, in part. in interstate commerce as incidental to its general
business. Such a tax is not considered a tax on the privilege of
engaging in interstate commerce, but a tax on the privilege of doing
(9o0). where it was held that a tax on the gross amount of premiums
received in the state did not include premiums sent by policyholders within
the state by mail directly to the home office of the company in another
state.
'Del., etc.. R. R. Co. v. Penna., 1g8 U. S. 34T (igos) ; Louisville &J.
Terry Co. v. Ky., x88 U. S. 385 (xoj3); N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Bradley, 83
S. C. 418 (1909).
*Cooper Mfg. Co. v. Ferguson, 113 U. S. 727 (1885) ; Kilgore v. Smith,
1=2 Pa. St. 48 (1888).
People v. Kelsey, 101 N. Y. App. 205 (igos).
"McCall v. Cal.. 136 U. S. i04 (i8go); Norfolk, etc., R. R. Co. 136
U. S. 114 (i8go); Crutcher v. Ky., 141 U. S. 47 ('891). A state may,
however, tax a domestic corporation engaged in interstate commerce for the privilege of being a corporation. Kansas City Ry. v. Kansas,
242 U. S. 227 (r916); Cornell Steamboat Co. v. Solinur. 235 U..S. 549 ig9).

NOTES
a strictly private business within the state, although the conduct of
such business may in fact involve interstate commerce."
But although a state may not tax a foreign corporation for the
privilege of engaging in interstate commerce, it may tax the property of such corporation which is actually within the state, although
such property is being used in interstate commerce,23 provided the
..payment of the tax be not made a condition precedent to the right
to carry on the business, but its enforcement is left to the ordinary
means devised for the collection of taxes." 14 An important distinction is also drawn between the property employed to carry on interstate commerce, which may be taxed, and the property which forms
the commerce, which may not be taxed while actually in transit."'
This does not mean, however, that a state may not tax property
which has been a part of interstate commerce or which is designed
to become a part of such commerce at a future date. 6 It is now a
well-settled principle that a state may not tax a foreign corporation
on its gross receipts, as such, received within the state from interstate commerce, because a tax on such gross receipts is, in effect, a
direct burden on interstate commerce, which cannot be justified as
a property tax, because gross receipts are not now considered by the
courts as part of the taxable property of a corporation.t But a
property tax, strictly speaking, frequently bears a close resemblance
to a tax on gross receipts, which fact has been productive of a certain
degree of confusion in the law. The value of the property of a business or industrial concern is closely co-related with the earning
powers of such property as represented by the gross receipts of the
business; and as the gross receipts of a corporation increase or
diminish, so also may the value of the property which contributed
to those receipts be said to increase or diminish. Therefore, in
taxing a foreign corporation upon the basis of the property which it
owns within the state, it is permissible for the state to consider the
property as a productive agency, whose value is proportional to and
,Pembina

Milling Co. v. Penna., sut'ra. n. i. Horn Mining Co. v.

N. Y., 143 U. S. 3o5 (ig9i); N. V. v. Roberts, 171 U. S. 658 (i89); Baltic
Mining Co. v. Mass., 213 U. S. 68 (1913).
"Pullman Car Co. v. Penna.. 141 U. S. 18 (189i). A property tax
laid on property without the state is illegal either as a deprivation of
property without due process of law, or as a direct burden upon commerce. W. U. Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. i (igio); Pullman Co. v.
Kansas, 216 U. S. s6 (9Io).
" Postal Tel. Co. v.Adams, 155 U. S. 688 (1895).
"Coe v.Erroll. i6 U. S. 5i7 (0,6). As to what constitutes actual
transit, see General Oil Co. v. Crain, 2o9 U. S. 211 (x9o8); Susquehanna
Coal Co. v. South Amboy, 228 U. S. 665 (1913).
"Brown v.Houston, 114 U. S. 622 (1885).
"'Fargo v. Mich., 121 U. S.23o 0887); Phila. S. S. Co. v. Penna.,
122 U. S. 3-6 (1887); Galveston, etc., Rwy. Co. v. Texas, 210 U. S. 217

(ixo8).

578

UNIVERSITY OF PEV.NrSYLVA.VI.4 LAW REVIEW

fluctuates with the receipts of the corporation to which it contributes.
A state may, therefore, levy a tax upon the property, within its
borders, of a foreign corporation, although the amount of the tax is
dependent upon the gross receipts of the corporation within the
state, it being considered that the gross receipts, in such case, are
simply an index, or measure, of the value of the property." Although
the rule is clear, it is often difficult, as a practical matter, to distinguish the two foffms of tax; but where, from the facts, the court is
convinced, in any particular case, that the state is attempting to taic
the gross receipts of a foreign corporation engaged in interstate
commerce, under the guise of a tax upon its property, it will declare
the tax illegal. The recent decisions of the Supreme Court indicate
a pronounced tendency on the part of the court to look behind forms
and to ascertain what was the real intention of the state in assessing
the tax, and upon what the tax operates as a matter of fact, rather
than to formulate any stereotyped rules to govern all cases. If the
tax is, in effect, an indiscriminatory property taxi it will be upheld,
though in the form of a tax on gross receipts ; while on the other
hand, if, in effect, it is a tax on the gross receipts derived from
interstate commerce, or on the privilege of engaging in interstate
E
commerce within the stateit will be repudiated. 1

INSURANCE-RIGHT OF BENEFICIARY-TERM1NATION OF CONTINGENT RIGHT OF CiiILD-Is BENEFICIARY'S RIGHT TESTAMENTARY

OR CONTRACTUAL?-It is a common proviso in a policy of life insurance payable to the wife of the insured, that in the event of her
death before the insured, it shall be payable to her children. Where
the contingency occurs, by the death of the wife before the insured,
in which children does the interest vest? Does it vest in all those
living at the timie the policy is issued; that is to say, are the representatives: of a child who has predeceased the mother entitled to
share: or does it vest solely in those surviving the mother? If there
are three children living at the date of issuance of a policy containing such a clause and one child dies, followed by the death of the
mother, are the proceeds divisible between the two surviving children or will the issue or personal representative of the deceased
child be entitled to a share? Two distinct lines of cases are found
in the reports construing such policies of insurance. One line
142 Lt. S. 217 (89): Postal Tel. Co.
(1895): U. S. Expr. v. Minn.. 223 U. S. 335 (1912);
Baltic Mining Co. v. Mass, 231 U. S. 68 (1913).

Maine v. Grand Trunk Co.,

v. Adams. 155 U. S. 688

"Galveston. etc.. R*y. Co. v. Texas. 210 U. S. 217 (9o8); U. S. Expr.
Co. v. Minn., 223 U. S. 335 (i912): Baltic Mining Co. v. Mass., 231 U. S.
68 (1913); Kansas City Rwy. v. Kans., 24o U. S. 227 (1916).

NOTES

follows what may be called the Connecticut view, while the other
line stands for what may be designated as the New York view.1'
The Connecticut rule holds that upon the issuance of the policy
a transmissible interest immediately vests in the children, and that
if a child should die before the insured and then the wife should
likewise predecease the insured, the interest of the deceased child
would continue and pass by descent
The process of reasoning
which leads to this conclusion is based upon the proposition that a
policy of insurance is testamentary in its nature and character and
should be so construed. When considered with respect to the rights
of those who claim to be beneficiaries, it should be regarded in the
light of a testamentary provision rather than of a contract Upon
the death of the mother before the assured her interest is extinguished and the contract of insurance stands between the company
and the children as though she had never been a party to it. It is
said that "'theright of the children is more than a mere expectancy
or naked possibility. It is a possibility coupled with an interest,
which is transmissible to the heirs of the children." 4
On the other hand, if the policy of insurance is to be regarded
purely as a contract between the parties to the same, a different
conclusion naturally follows, and in this lies the principal reason for
the diversity of opinion on the part of the courts. Such is the New
York rule, which holds that only those of the children as survive
the mother can take, and the issue or personal representatives of a
child who dies before her are excluded.' The rules which obtain
regarding the vesting of estates created by will have no application,
for a will is in no sense a contract and an insurance policy is. It
should therefore be construed in accordance with the rules applicable
to ordinary contracts. The child has simply a contingent interest in
the property which was defeated by its death prior to that of the
mother, and so no interest was transmitted either to its issue or personal representative. Upon the death of the mother, all interest in
the policy vests immediately in the children then living.
'Richards,

Insurance (3d Ed.), Sec. 67.

'Continental Insurance Co. v. Palmer. 42 Conn. 6o 0875); Js re
Estate of Conrad. 89 Iowa 396 (1893); Robinson v. DuvaUl, ;- Ky. 83
(i8o): Voss v. Connecticut. etc.. Ins. Co., 119 Mich. 161 t1899); Michigan

Mutual. etc., Co. v. Basler, i4o Mich. 233 (igos); Glenn v. Bums, x0o Tenn.
22 (1897).

. Robinsoh v. Duvall, supra.
'Voss Y. Connecticut, etc., Ins. Co., supra.
'Lerch v. Frentel, 36 X. Y. Misc. 58x (toot); U. S. Trust C. v.
Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co.. 5 .X. Y. Y-2 (1889); N"alsh v. Mutual Life
Ins. Co., 133 X. Y. 408 (1892); Davis v. X. Y. Life Ins. Co, 212 Mass.
.310 (1912 ) : Winsor V. Odd Fellows. etc.. Ass'n, 13 R. 1. 149 (188D) : Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Webb. q4 Ala. 688 (1875): Elgar v. Equitable. etc.,
Co.. it1 Wis. go (0o ); Fidelity Trust Co. v. Marshall, 178 N. Y. 468
(194); Succession of Roder, 121 La. 692 (igo8).
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In a recent case in Indiana, Burnctt v. Mutual Life Insurance
Company,' the problem arose for the first time before that court,
and the so-called New York rule was applied. Neither the issue nor
the personal representatives of a child who had predeceased its
mother were entitled to any interest in the proceeds of the policy,
but the whole vested in the children surviving at the death of the
mother.T
The basis of the difference in the courts is between the rules
governing where a contractual relation exists between the parties
and thdse principles applicable to a case relating to the vesting of
an estate created by a will. Under the New York view that the beneficiary's right is merely contractual, "children" is given its ordinary
meaning; while under the Connecti~ut view that the right is testamentary and that the interest which vests in the children immediately upon the issuance of the policy is such as to be transmitted by
the law of descent, "children" is made to include "grandchildren."
It is true that in a certain sense, upon the issuance of the policy, an
interest in, or right to, its continuance as an obligation does vest
or, more properly, inure to the children. But it is submitted that
it does not vest in the technical sense of the term as it is used in
connection with estates created under testamentary devises. Properly, it seems to be a right of no higher quality than that it will be
protected in favor of the children so long as there is a possibility of
it eventually inuring to their benefit. While such a provision as here
under consideration partakes of a testamentary nature in that it is
to take effect after the death of the insured, it is after all purely a
contract between the insured and the insurance company, and as
such the beneficiary is seeking to enforce it. Greater strictness is
T14
1

'Such

E. 234 (Ind. i916).
a provision in a life policy and involving the exact state of

N.

facts under consideration here, has not as yet been passed upon by a court

of last resort in Pennsylvania. In Brown's Appeal, 125 Pa. 303 (1889).
and Entwistle v. Travelers Ins. Co.. 202 Pa. 141 (Tgo). the policies contained such a clause, lut the children were all alive at the time of the
death of the mother. The Supreme Court indicated that they viewed this
clause as a contract to be construed as such and not as a testamentary
disposition. The exact state of facts arose in Estate of Thorne, 50 Pittsburgh L. .J. 233 (t9o.), where there were three children living at date
of issuance of the policy, but one predeceased the mother. The Allegheny County Court held that the deceased child had a contingent
interest which passed to his administrator and became absolute
Another lower court decision, and
by the death of his mother.
.the latest in which this question was involved, is Braddock v. Manhattan
Life Ins. Co, i6 Pa. Dist. R. 127 (1906). judge (now Justice) Von
Moschzisker, after analyzing the New York and the Connecticut rule and
showing that the question -was still an open one in Pennsylvania, concluded
that the heirs of the child who had predeceased its mother, were not entitled. There being no other children, the proceeds of the policy were
payable to the personal representatives of the mother. The court accepted
the New York rule and apparently had no knowledge of the Pittsburgh
case decided three years before. The decision was not appealed from.

NOTES
properly required in the construction of the terms of a contract,
which have been chosen after negotiations and consideration -of
their effect by the parties and which are presumed to correctly
describe their rights and liabilities; whereas in a will, which is solely
the expression of the testator's intention, a more liberal rule of construction is adopted in order to prevent the defeat of his purposes.
There is nothing in the contract of insurance as such, which would
warrant a court in giving to the word "children" any other than its
ordinary meaning. So interpreted, it excludes grandchildren-that
is to say, children of a child who has predeceased its mother, the
primary beneficiary, and necessarily leads to the conclusion that
only those children take who survive their mother. Under this kind
of insurance clause, where the aim is to protect the wife and children
after the death of the insured, it seems more consonant with reason
to say that when the contractual relation with the mother ceases by
her death, they who were her children at this moment are the only
ones whom it is intended to protect and should be the only ones to
assert and enforce an interest as substituted parties in the place of
their mother.
P.H.R.
PROPERTY-VILLS-DEPENDENT RELATIVE

REVOCATION-GIFTS

•ro CHARTIEs-The doctrine of dependent relative revocation .of
wills is one which from its very nature involves many difficulties in
application. It is not surprising, therefore, that the cases show a
g-reat amount of uncertainty and of inconsistency. Arising, as it did,
in the Court of Chancery at a comparatively early period,' this doctrine has exerted a profound influence on the courts both of England
and of this country, and, while the tendency, particularly in the
American coutts, has been to limit its application as narrowly as
possible without departing from established authority, still the
doctrine vigorously persists. Stated broadly, the doctrine may be
said to be, that where a testator revokes a will, wholly or in part, in
reliance on a supposed state of facts and those facts are really nonexistent, the revocation is inoperative because it was conditioned upon
the existence of the supposed facts.
A recent case illustrating the tendency of the courts to restrict
the operation of the doctrine is that of Ely v. Megie,2 where the
New York court refused to apply it. In that case the testator had
by a codicil in 1go9 left the residue of his estate to be divided among
eight charitable associations. In 191i he executed a second codicil,
wherein he in terms revoked that part of the codicil of x9o9, and
substituted therefor, inter alia, bequests of $xoo,ooo each to four of
the original eight legatees, these legacies being expressly subject to
'Onions v. Tyrer, -2 Vern. 742 (1717).
'Ely v. Megie, 219 N. Y. 11, i3 N. E. 80o (1x16).
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abatement before the other bequests of the will and codicil. The
trial justice found as facts that the testator's property had been
largely increased between 1909 and 191I by a bequest of over
$i,ooo,ooo left him by his brother, and that it was the testators
intention to modify the bequests of x9o9 by limiting them to $iooooo
and not wholly to revoke the earlier bequests. The testator having
died before the expiration of two months, the bequests to charitable
associations in the codicil of 1911 were invalid under the New York
-statute. It was urged that this was a proper case to apply the
doctrine of dependent relative revocation so as to reinstate the codicil of igo; but the court held that that codicil bad been absolutely
revoked in spite of the failure of the bequests in the revoking codiciL
The cases where the doctrine has been invoked seem to fall into
the following classes:
(x) Where the earlier will or codicil has been destroyed by one
of the physical acts allowed by the statutes. In these cases the act
of destruction is an equivocal act, and the intention is properly a
matter for inquiry, for such acts should have no validity unless
coupled with an intent to revoke. But in applying the doctrine, the
courts go further than this and inquire whether, there being an
intention to revoke at the time, that intention is based on a supposed
state of facts which do not in reality exist.'
(2) Where the revocation is hy a later will or codicil expressly
revoking the earlier one, but stating certain supposed facts as the
reason for that revocation. In such cases practically all jurisdictions agree in applying the doctrine. It is, however, subject to two
important qualifications: first, that the revoking codicil must clearly
state a reliance on a belief in the supposed facts, mere doubt not
being sufficient; 5 secondly, that where the facts are such as to be
peculiarly within the testator's own knowledge and for which he
need not rely on information obtained from others, the doctrine has
no application.
(3) Where the testator has cancelled or obliterated a particular
legacy or devise in a will and attempted to substitute another,, the
substitutions being void because improperly executed. Here, again,
it is well settled that the doctrine should be applied.
(4) Where a revoking instrument is itself revoked, on the supposition that this will revive a former will.'
'Onions v. Tyrer, ,supro; Dancer v. Crabb, L. R. 3 P. & D. 98 (873).

*Campbell
228 (1839).

v. French, 3 Ves. Jr. 321 (797);

Doe v. Evans, io A. & E.

'Attorney-General v. Lloyd, i Ves. Sr. 3z (1747).
•Hayes .v. Hayes, 21 N. J. Eq. 265 (1871); Appeal of Mendinhall, 124

Pa. 387 (1889).

'Locke v. James. ii M. & W. got (843).

'Powell v. Powell. L. R. i P. & D. -09 (z866).
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(5)Where the testator revokes a provision of his wili by a
later instrument which is properly executed, but which cannot take
effect because of some matter dehors the instrument, as, e. g, a
mortmain act.
The principal case falls within the last-described class. In this
group of cases the courts almost always refuse to apply the doctrine. Where the testator has expressly* stated his intention to
revoke and has not stated any supposed facts in such a way as to
condition his revocation the eon, the revocation is absolute and
evidence of matters dchors the instrument is not receivable. On
principle there seems to be little reason why, if the doctrine is a
sound one, it should not be applied here as well as in those cases
where it is held to apply, for the intention of the testator in case of
a failure of his later disposition is no more a matter of conjecture
than in other cases: but the line is clearly drawn by the authorities.
Within the last-named group of cases, however, the principal
case represents a type as to which there has been some uncertafity;
ti., where the later instrument in terms revokes, but its effect is
merely to cut down an earlier gift. The point seems to have arisen
oftener in Pennsylvania than elsewhere, and in several decisions
the Supreme Court of that state has taken the position that in such
cases the later provision should be considered a revocation only pro
tanto of the gift in the earlier instrument, and not an absolute revocation of it and a new gift. as the language would seem to indicate.
So, where a testator revoked an earlier gift of a sum of money to
a charity and left the sum to trustees, who should pay the interest
to certain relatives during their lives and then pay the whole to the
same charity, the court considered that the codicil merely postponed
the time of payment. and held that there was no revocation, although
the testator stated that he "annulled and revoked." 1o Likewise,
where the testator revoked several bequests and directed that the
sums so released should be added to the residue of his estate, and
further directed that the residue be divided into seven instead of
six shares as provided by the will, the court found no revocation of
the former gift or part of the residue to a charity, but merely a
cutting down of the share given.-1 These decisions, in a state whose
cases 12 have gone -as far as any to discredit the entire doctrine, are
illustrations of the unsatisfactory state of the law on this subject.
The decision in the principal case seems not only to be in.
thorough accord with the strong tendency of the American courts,
'Tupper v. Tupper, T K. & J. 66. (855); Hairston v. Hairston. lo
Miss. 276 (18351. Dunham v. Averill, 45 Conn. 6T (1877): Commrs. v.
Scott, 88 Minn. 386 (zoo.3): McIntyre v. McIntyre, t2o Ga. 67"(9o4).
"Sloan's Appeal. 168 Pa. 422 (i895).
"Morrow's Estate. -04 Pa. 484 (9o3).
" Emernecker's Estate. 218 Pa. 369 (i9o7): Melville's Estate, 245 Pa. 318

(1914).
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but with the sound public policy which led to the enactment of the
Statute of Frauds and the later wills acts in England and in this
country. Where a testator has unconditionally stated his intention
to revoke an earlier testamentary paper and accompanied it with a
different disposition of his property, it is a matter of conjecture
what he would have intended had he known that his later disposition would fail. When the courts attempt to determine that intention, serious difficulties are certain to follow. The policy of all our
statutes has been 1o. require testamentary papers to fulfill certain
formalities, in order to do away with proof of wills by parol testimoiv. It is an inherent weakness of the doctrine of dependent
relative revocation that it introduces parol testimony into all cases
where it is applied, and it seems best, therefore, that it should be
strictly limited in its operation.
w. IV. S.

WORK AND LABOR - FRAUD - A difficult
QUASi-CONTRACT problem arises where compensation is sought for services rendered
in the family relation. Express contracts under such circumstances
are rare, and in the absence of a contract recovery is almost impossible. Nor wil, the law imply a contract of this sort. The rule is
that services thus rendered will be presumed gratuitous.' The party
seeking recovery is thus left to his quasi-contractual remedy. In
many jurisdictions, however, the quasi-contractual action is restricted
to cases in which a definite sum of money has come into the hands
of the party sought to be charged; in these jurisdictions the party2
seeking repayment for his services is apparently without a remedy.
In a jurisdiction where the quasi-contractual action is not so
restricted,3 other limitations must be taken into account. The presumption above mentioned, that the services were gratuitous, must
be rebutted, and this, it seems, can be done only where fraud is
shown to have been perpetrated.'
A great deal of 'ivork is doubtless performed with a vague
expectation of future reward by persons more or less remotely
related to the beneficiary-witncss the extreme solicitude with
which a galaxy of relatives attend the illness of a dying testator.
When the anticipated return has not been realized, the resort is
usually and nec6siirily to the action cx quasi contract. It is, however, recognized that such actions are in the nature of an afterthought, the !result of disappointed expectations. The lips of an
'Kingston v. Roberts, 137 S. AV. 1042 (Mo. 19T3).
'Graham v. Stanton. 177 Mass. 321 (1901).
'Blowers v. Southern Ry. Co.. -4 S. C. 221 (19o6).
'Peter v. Steel, 3 Yeates 250 (Pa. 1800).
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important party to the transaction are closed, and except in the case
,f fraud, the presumption is rigorously applied. It should, however,
be noted that the presumption that the services thus rendered are
gratuitous, like the more general presumption that work- is to be
paid for, is merely a presumption of evidence and not of law. An
,.xamination of the cases on the point, however, -reveals the fact
that it is an almost irrebutable presumption. 5
A very doubtful situation is presented where services are rendered by A to B, both parties being under the erroneous impression
-hat they are related. When the actual facts are brought home to A
',e seeks to recover the value of the labor he has bestowed upon B,
which, he alleges, he would not have performed gratuitously had he
,een aware of the actual status of the parties. On the other hand,
itis not at all clear that B would have received the services had he
!ielieved they were to be paid for. A distinction might, indeed, be
drawn depending upon the nature of the services. Where it could
tieshown that the services were absolutely necessary, and, but for
Vs performance, B would have been compelled to employ a third
party, recovery should be allowed. The question is more or less
academic, as the precise point does not seem to have -arisen.
In the usual case the question is entirely one of evidence, with
a very strong presumption against the party seeking recovery. Upon
him is the burden of establishing a contract, no quasi-contractual
problem being at all involved. It is not at all easy to justify the
exception made in this case to the general rule that all services are
to be compensated, upon any legal or logical basis. The point has
been made that the very existence of the family relation negatives
any notion of payment; that the amenities of family life call for a
great deal of work and labor, which, in ordinary social intercourse,
nust be paid for. "The family relationship," it has been judicially
said,' "is presumed to abound in reciprocal acts of kindness and
good-will, which tend to the mutual comfort and convenience of
the members of the family and are gratuitously performed." The
raison d'Otre as thus stated by the courts and quoted with approval
by text-writers, hardly suffices to cover the case before mentioned,
where the services are rendered under the mistaken impression that
the parties are related. In such case the intent with which the
services were given, which is stressed in the opinion quoted, would
seem immaterial. The plaintiff would admit that at the time the
services were performed there was no expectation of the payment
sought to be recovered; but it would also be submitted that the action
was a quasi-contractual one, and brought on the broad basis of substantial justice, irrespective of and possibly in the teeth of the actual
intent. It may be pointed out in passing that in no case has friendship or the amenities of social life been allowed to overcome the
'Walker v; Taylor. 28 Col. 23.3 (0x).
'Disbrav v. Durand, s4 N. J. L-343 (1802).
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general presumption of payment for services rendered, which-the
law has adopted.
It may therefore be stated that where relief is sought in quasicontract on the ground of mistake of fact, the intent of the parties
at the time the transaction took place should not be a decisive factor.
The same is true with even greater force where it is shown that the
labor has been secured by the imposition of fraud. A very recent
case adopts just this line of reasoning. In Sanders v. Ragan,"
recovery was sought against the estate of the deceased for serwces
rendered by the plaintiff as his housekeeper. A ceremony of marriage had been performed, and the plaintiff believed she was the
wife of the deceased, but on his death it appeared that be had been
lawfully married to another woman who was still alive. The court
permitted recovery, saying inter alia: "The action of assumpsit as
stated, is dependent largely upon equitable principles, and in theabsence of a special contract controlling the matter, it will usually
lie where one man has been enriched or his estate enhanced at
another's expense that in equity and good conscience call for an
accounting by the wrongdoer." The court refused to apply as a
test the intention of the parties. It cut through the contractual
form of the action and adopted the logic of a similar case, in which
it was stated that an implied promise does not always depend upon
the existence of an intention in fact of the one to pay and the other
to receive. "'Thelaw frequently affixes a promise to pay even contrary to the actual intention."'
Some of the courts, however, have denied recovery for services
rendered under mistake of fact or even in cases of fraud on the
ground that payment was not intended.

In 'Cooper v. Cooper,*

under facts analogous to those of the principal case, the court in
denying recovery said: "The fact that she (the plaintiff) believed
herself to be a wife, excluded the inference that the society and
assistance of a wife which she gave to her supposed husband were
for hire." The actual decision of the court can be justified under
the .Massachusetts doctrine which permits recovery in quasi-contract
only where money has come into the hands of the tort-feasor, but
it is submitted that the language used by the court clearly shows
that such was not the ground for the decision.
It is submitted that the rule of law which considers work done
in the family gratuitous, and the exception thereto which permits
recovery in case of fraud, can be put upon a single basis. It may
be stated that a party cannot recover for services thus rendered
because of the absence of a contract, express or implied; normally
he cannot recover in quasi-contract because no equity requires that
19o

S. F- 777 (N. C. r916)..

* ickham v. Hickain. 46 Mo. App. o.4 (z89I).

0147 Mass. 370 (888).
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he be compensated. The family may be considered as embarked
upon a mutual enterprise, and in aiding any particular member of
the group one but aids himself. In the principal case no equity
requires that a wife be paid for her services. These are bestowed
in the mutual partnership out of the profits of which the law gave
her, as wife, certain benefits. In so far as no such status existed,
however, she should !e entitled to at least the value of her services
as employee.
B. IV.

